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The dual process model of moral decision-making suggests that decisions to reject
causing harm on moral dilemmas (where causing harm saves lives) reflect concern
for others. Recently, some theorists have suggested such decisions actually reflect
self-focused concern about causing harm, rather than witnessing others suffering. We
examined brain activity while participants witnessed needles pierce another person’s
hand, versus similar non-painful stimuli. More than a month later, participants completed
moral dilemmas where causing harm either did or did not maximize outcomes. We
employed process dissociation to independently assess harm-rejection (deontological)
and outcome-maximization (utilitarian) response tendencies. Activity in the posterior
inferior frontal cortex (pIFC) while participants witnessed others in pain predicted
deontological, but not utilitarian, response tendencies. Previous brain stimulation studies
have shown that the pIFC seems crucial for sensorimotor representations of observed
harm. Hence, these findings suggest that deontological response tendencies reflect
genuine other-oriented concern grounded in sensorimotor representations of harm.
Keywords: embodiment, empathy, fMRI, moral dilemmas, moral judgment, process dissociation, neural
resonance
INTRODUCTION
Imagine watching a video of a hypodermic syringe slowly and deliberately piercing a human hand.
Despite knowing that the hand belongs to someone else, would you wince and reflexively withdraw
your hand, or shrug and stay put? Would you empathize with the person getting pierced? If so,
what does your reaction reveal about your moral psychology? The dual-process model of dilemma
judgments (Greene et al., 2001) suggests that when people face dilemmas where causing harm saves
lives, rejecting such harm (despite not saving lives) reflects other-oriented affective processing. In
contrast, judgments to accept harm (thereby maximizing outcomes) reflect cognitive evaluations of
outcomes. On such dilemmas, rejecting harm is said to uphold deontological morality, where the
morality of actions derives from their intrinsic nature (Kant, 1785/1959), whereas accepting harm
is said to uphold utilitarian morality, where the morality of actions derives from their outcomes
(Mill, 1861/1998). Although considerable evidence supports the dual process model (e.g., Bartels,
2008; Amit and Greene, 2012; Conway and Gawronski, 2013; Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013; cf.
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Kahane, 2015), some theorists have questioned whether the
affective processing involved in harm-rejection truly reflects
other-oriented concern. Affective reactions to harm in dilemma
judgments may reflect self-focused emotions centered on causing
harm, rather than genuine concern generated by others in pain
(Miller et al., 2014).
When people know that others are experiencing pain,
sensorimotor and affective systems in their brains respond as
though they are personally experiencing pain (Singer et al., 2004;
Avenanti et al., 2005; Lamm et al., 2011). This phenomenon,
called neural resonance (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012), has also been
documented for disgust (Wicker et al., 2003; Jabbi et al., 2007),
emotions (Carr et al., 2003; Pfeifer et al., 2008), and motor
behavior (Fadiga et al., 1995). A key moderator for the presence or
absence of activity in sensorimotor circuits seems to be the direct
observation of others experiencing pain (Avenanti et al., 2005).
When others’ pain is communicated through symbolic cues (e.g.,
lightning bolts) rather than direct observation, affective circuits
are activated, but sensorimotor circuits are not (Singer et al.,
2004).
Although researchers conceptualize neural resonance as a
component of empathy (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012), they have
primarily examined immediate reactions to real-time stimuli,
such as smiling faces or video clips of hands getting pierced
by needles, rather than personality traits or decision-making
tendencies in unrelated contexts. Yet, recent findings suggest
that individual differences in neural resonance predict other
aspects of an individual’s traits and behavior. Specifically, neural
resonance for pain correlates with peoples’ tendency to take
others’ perspectives and feel distressed by harm to others
(Avenanti et al., 2009). Neural resonance for pain also correlates
with charitable donations (Ma et al., 2011), helping behavior
(Hein et al., 2011; Morelli et al., 2014), and generosity in
economic games where strategic giving does not play any
role (Christov-Moore and Iacoboni, 2016). Since correlation
is not causation, we have further tested the meaning of
these correlations with disruptive brain stimulation, showing
that it is possible to modulate generosity by stimulating
brain areas whose activity correlates with offers (Christov-
Moore et al., 2017). Furthermore, deontological response
tendencies on moral dilemmas correlate with empathic concern
and perspective-taking (e.g., Conway and Gawronski, 2013;
Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013). These findings suggest that the
neural mechanisms associated with pre-reflective reactions to
others’ internal states may also be relevant to moral decision-
making.
We propose that people who show greater neural resonance
with the pain of others should evince stronger tendencies to reject
harm in moral dilemmas, in line with the dual-process model
(Greene et al., 2001). This finding would clarify that internal
representations of others’ states (rather than just self-focused
emotions) contribute to moral dilemma judgments. Such effects
should pertain only to harm-rejection (deontological) response
tendencies, which are linked to affective processing, rather than
outcome-maximization (utilitarian) response tendencies, which
are linked to cognitive processing (Conway and Gawronski,
2013). To examine this possibility, we employed process
dissociation (PD, Jacoby, 1991) to disentangle the impacts
of harm-rejection and outcome-maximization tendencies on
conventional relative dilemma judgments (for a review of PD, see
Payne and Bishara, 2009).
In the current work, we recorded participants’ brain
activation while they watched videos of needles piercing
hands (versus hands gently touched with a Q-tip). A month
later or more, participants completed the PD moral dilemma
battery, containing 10 moral dilemmas, each with two versions
(Conway and Gawronski, 2013). Each dilemma entails causing
harm to achieve a particular outcome: incongruent dilemmas
correspond to conventional relative moral dilemmas where
causing harm maximizes outcomes (hence deontological and
utilitarian considerations conflict); congruent dilemmas involve
causing harm that does not maximize outcomes (so deontological
and utilitarian considerations align – both suggest rejecting
harm). Participants indicated whether each harmful action was
appropriate or not appropriate. By applying participant responses
to both kinds of dilemmas to a processing tree (see Figure 1),
we can mathematically represent the probability of accepting
or rejecting harm in each case, and algebraically combine
these equations to solve for two previously unknown variables:
deontological inclinations (reflecting a pattern of consistently
rejecting harm regardless of whether doing so maximizes
outcomes), and utilitarian inclinations (reflecting a pattern of
maximizing outcomes, whether or not doing so entails causing
harm).
Conway and Gawronski (2013) found that deontological
response tendencies uniquely correlated with measures of other-
oriented concern, such as empathic concern and perspective-
taking (Davis, 1983) and were uniquely increased when
viewing photos of the victims of harm, clarifying similar
findings on conventional dilemma judgments (e.g., Bartels, 2008;
Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013). Conversely, utilitarian response
tendencies uniquely correlated with measures of cognitive
processing, such as need for cognition (Epstein et al., 1996),
and are uniquely impaired by cognitive load, again clarifying
similar findings on relative judgments (e.g., Greene et al.,
2008; Moore et al., 2008). Meta-analytic results indicated that
deontological and utilitarian response tendencies are typically
uncorrelated, but each correlates with conventional relative
dilemma judgments in opposite directions (Friesdorf et al.,
2015), suggesting that the PD parameters reflect two independent
response tendencies that jointly influence conventional relative
dilemma judgments.
Given research suggesting that deontological dilemma
response tendencies reflect relatively affective other-oriented
concern, whereas utilitarian dilemma response tendencies reflect
relatively cognitive outcome-focused processing, we predicted
that when viewing others in pain, activation in brain regions
associated with pain processing would predict deontological,
but not utilitarian, response tendencies. However, if Miller
et al. (2014) are correct that deontological decisions primarily
reflect self-focused concerns over causing harm, rather than
other-focused affective processing regarding witnessing harm,
then brain activation while witnessing others in pain (pain one
did not cause) should not predict dilemma response tendencies.
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FIGURE 1 | Processing tree illustrating the underlying components leading to judgments that harmful action is either acceptable or unacceptable in congruent and
incongruent moral dilemmas, allowing researchers to estimate utilitarian response tendencies (maximize outcomes regardless of whether doing so causes harm or
not) and deontological response tendencies (reject causing harm regardless of whether doing maximizes outcomes or not).
Moreover, we aimed to clarify the nature of other-oriented
concern involved in deontological dilemma decisions. As
mentioned above, neural resonance for pain recruits both
affective (anterior cingulate, medial prefrontal cortex, and
anterior insula) and sensorimotor (ventral premotor cortex,
inferior parietal lobe, and primary motor cortex) neural systems
to different extents depending on stimuli and context (reviewed
in Lamm et al., 2011). We employed stimuli known to activate
both sensorimotor and affective systems (Avenanti et al., 2005;
Bufalari et al., 2007) – videos of painful stimuli applied to
others (Avenanti et al., 2005) – to examine which system best
predicts deontological dilemma response tendencies, rather than
employing stimuli known to selectively activate affective but not
sensorimotor networks (as in Singer et al., 2004), which would
prevent us from testing these hypotheses against one another.
If affective systems best predict deontological tendencies,
this may suggest that deontological decisions primarily reflect
general affective responses to others’ pain. On the other hand, if
sensorimotor circuits best predict deontological tendencies, this
may suggest that deontological decisions are partially grounded
in participants’ previous personal perceptual and motor
experiences of pain. In other words, witnessing a needle pierce
someone else’s hand may lead participants to imagine, albeit
likely implicitly, how others experience the physical sensation
of having their hand pierced. Such physiological representations
of others’ pain may lead participants to reject actions that cause
others pain – such as endorsing deontological moral dilemma
judgments. Note that whereas previous functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) dilemma research examined brain
activation as participants completed the dilemma task itself
(e.g., Greene et al., 2001, 2004), we examined brain activation
in response to unrelated stimuli – the needle task – and used
this activation to predict dilemma responses made over 1 month
later.
To recapitulate, this study tested two hypotheses. First,
we examined whether neural responses to witnessing another
person experience pain predicted subsequent deontological
(but not utilitarian) dilemma response tendencies. Second, we
investigated the nature of the functional processes associated
with deontological tendencies: whether they are best predicted by
systems involved in general affective processing, or by systems




We recruited 19 ethnically diverse adults aged 18–35 (9 female),
through community fliers. We required that participants were
right handed, with no prior or concurrent diagnosis of any
neurological (e.g., epilepsy, Tourette’s syndrome), psychiatric
(e.g., schizophrenia), or developmental disorders (e.g., ADHD,
dyslexia), and no history of drug or alcohol abuse. All recruitment
and experimental procedures were performed under approval of
UCLA’s institutional review board.
Functional MRI Procedure
Pain Video Task
We employed (with permission) the 27 full-color video stimuli
from Bufalari et al. (2007). Each video depicted the same human
hand being pierced by a hypodermic syringe in varying locations
(Pain condition), being touched by a wooden Q-tip in the same
locations (Touch condition), or in isolation (Hand condition).
The run consisted of 12 trial blocks lasting 26 s each, plus 8
alternating rest blocks that lasted either 5 or 10 s. Each trial
block consisted of four videos of a single condition (Pain, Touch,
Hand), each 5 s in duration, with an interstimulus interval of
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400 ms. Subjects were simply instructed to watch the video clips.
They were assured that the hand in the video clip was a human
hand and not a model, but they were not instructed to empathize
with the model, nor were there any audiovisual cues to indicate
pain from the hand’s owner. We used (and controlled for)
three different block orders, and ensured an approximately equal
proportion of male and female subjects viewed each order. We
coded the task within Presentation (created by Neurobehavioral
Systems).
MR Image Acquisition
The fMRI data were acquired on a Siemens Trio 3 Tesla system
housed in the Ahmanson-Lovelace Brain Mapping Center at
UCLA. Functional images were collected over 36 axial slices
covering the whole cerebral volume using an echo planar T2∗-
weighted gradient echo sequence (TR = 2500 ms; TE = 25 ms;
flip angle = 90◦; matrix size = 64 × 64; FOV 20 cm; in-plane
resolution = 3 mm × 3 mm; slice thickness = 3 mm/1 mm
gap). Additionally, a high-resolution T1-weighted volume was
acquired in each subject (TR = 2300 ms; TE = 25 ms;
TI = 100 ms; flip angle = 8◦; matrix size = 192 × 192;
FOV = 256 cm; 160 slices), with approximately 1 mm isometric
voxels (1.3 mm× 1.3× 1.0 mm).
Functional MRI Analysis
Analyses were performed in FMRI Expert Analysis Tool
(FEAT), part of FMRIB’s Software Library (FSL)1. After motion
correction using MCFLIRT, images were temporally high-
pass filtered with a cutoff period of 70 s (approximately
equal to one rest-task-rest-task period), and smoothed using a
6 mm Gaussian FHWM algorithm in three dimensions. Each
participants’ functional data were co-registered to standard space
(MNI 152 template) via registration of an averaged functional
image to the high resolution T1-weighted volume using a six
degree-of-freedom linear registration and of the high-resolution
T1-weighted volume to the MNI 152 template via non-linear
affine registration, implemented in FNIRT.
In order to remove non-neuronal sources of coherent
oscillation in the relevant frequency band (0.01–0.1 Hz),
preprocessed data were subjected to probabilistic independent
component analysis as implemented in Multivariate Exploratory
Linear Decomposition into Independent Components
(MELODIC) Version 3.10, part of FSL2. Noise components
corresponding to head motion, scanner noise, and aliasing of
cardiac/respiratory signals were identified by observing their
localization, time series, and spectral properties (after Kelly et al.,
2010) and removed using FSL’s regfilt command.
We performed statistical analyses of fMRI data using
FSL’s implementation of the general linear model. For first
level analyses gauging task activation, the anticipated BOLD
response to each condition was modeled using an explanatory
variable (EV) consisting of a boxcar function describing the
onset and duration of each relevant experimental condition
(task conditions, rest, and instruction screen) convolved with
a canonical double-gamma hemodynamic response function
1www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl
(HRF) to produce an expected BOLD response. The temporal
derivative of each task EV was also included in the model to
improve the model fit and accommodate regional variations
in the BOLD signal. Functional data were then fitted to
the modeled BOLD signal using FSL’s implementation of the
general linear model. This produced parameter estimate maps
describing the goodness-of-fit of the data to the modeled
BOLD signal. Contrasts were then performed to isolate
clusters of voxels that showed significantly different parameter
estimates between each condition. Higher-level analyses were
implemented by including subjects’ scores on the deontological
and utilitarian parameters as separate EV’s against subjects’
parameter estimate maps (superimposed in standard space) for
the contrast Pain > Touch. Resultant whole-brain parameter
estimates representing the between-subject variance explained
by each behavioral EV were converted to normalized Z-scores
and corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level
(using Gaussian random field theory) using a cluster-wise
Z-threshold of 2.3 and p-value cutoff of 0.05, using FLAME
1 + 2. The resultant Z-statistic images from the higher-
level analysis were then masked by the activation map for
the contrast Pain > Touch. The rationale for this masking
procedure is straightforward: we were testing the hypothesis
that task-related activation of neural systems engaged in
processing others’ pain contributes to decision-making in
moral dilemmas. Task-irrelevant areas cannot speak to this
hypothesis.
Process Dissociation Dilemma Battery
In a separate experimental session conducted at least 1 month
following the neuroimaging protocol, participants completed
a battery of 10 moral dilemmas, each with two versions: an
incongruent and congruent version (Conway and Gawronski,
2013). Incongruent moral dilemmas correspond to traditional,
high-conflict moral dilemmas commonly employed in research
(e.g., Foot, 1967; Koenigs et al., 2007). In such dilemmas,
participants read a scenario where a great deal of harm is
impending, but participants could avoid this impending harm by
accepting causing a lesser degree of harm. For example, in the
crying baby dilemma, townspeople are hiding from murderous
soldiers, but a baby is about to cry, which will summon the
soldiers who will murder the townspeople. The actor could
fatally smother the baby to prevent its cries, thereby saving
the townspeople. Other dilemmas include torturing a person to
prevent a bomb from killing several people, and causing severe
harm to research animals to cure AIDS. Participants indicated
whether causing each harm in order to achieve the specified
outcome is appropriate or not appropriate (in line with Greene
et al., 2001).
Congruent dilemmas are worded identically to incongruent
dilemmas, except the outcome of causing harm has been
minimized. For example, in the congruent version of the crying
baby dilemma, the actor could kill the baby to prevent the
townspeople from being forced to performing hard labor. In
other dilemmas, the actor could torture a person to prevent
a messy but non-lethal paint bomb, or cause severe harm
to research animals to create a better facial cleanser. Again,
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participants indicated whether causing harm to achieve the
specified outcome in acceptable or not acceptable. Participants
responded to all dilemmas in the same fixed random order
as Conway and Gawronski (2013). By considering participant
responses to both incongruent and congruent dilemmas, it is
possible to perform a PD analysis (Jacoby, 1991) that provides
independent estimates of each participant’s inclination to reject
causing harm (consistent with deontology), that appears to track
affective reactions to harm, as well as inclinations to maximize
outcomes (consistent with utilitarianism), that appears to track
cognitive evaluations of outcomes (Conway and Gawronski,
2013).
We computed the deontological and utilitarian PD parameters
using the six formulae described by Conway and Gawronski
(2013). Consider Figure 1. The top path (U) illustrates the case
where utilitarianism drives responses: this entails rejecting harm
for congruent dilemmas but accepting harm for incongruent
dilemmas (thus always maximizing outcomes). Representing
the case where utilitarianism drives responses also allows
representing the case where utilitarianism does not drive
responses: (1−U). This case may be further subdivided into
(1) the case where deontology drives responses (1−U × D),
which entails rejecting harmful actions in both congruent and
incongruent dilemmas (thus always rejecting causing harm), as
well as (2) the case where neither utilitarianism nor deontology
drives responses (1−U × 1−D), which entails accepting harm for
both congruent and incongruent dilemmas (suggesting at best an
amoral insensitivity to the outcomes of one’s actions, or at worst
general willingness to cause harm even when doing so makes the
world worse overall).
Using the processing tree in Figure 1, researchers can
algebraically represent each case: when participants accept
or reject harm on congruent or incongruent dilemmas. For
congruent dilemmas, participants may reject harm either when
utilitarianism drives responses (U), or when utilitarianism
does not, but deontology does (1−U × D). Conversely,
participants may accept harm only when neither utilitarianism
nor deontology drives responses (1−U × 1−D). For incongruent
dilemmas, participants reject harm when utilitarianism does
not drive the response, but deontology does (1−U × D).
Conversely, people may accept harm either when utilitarianism
drives responses (U), or when neither utilitarianism nor
deontology drives responses (1−U × 1−D). By combining these
values, researchers can algebraically represent the cases when
participants accept and reject harm on congruent or incongruent
dilemmas. The probability of rejecting harm for congruent
dilemmas is represented by the case where either utilitarianism
drives the response, or when utilitarianism does not drive the
response, but deontology does:
p(unacceptable | congruent) = U + [(1− U)× D] (1)
Conversely, the probability of accepting harm for congruent
dilemmas is represented by the case that neither utilitarianism
nor deontology drives the response:
p(acceptable | congruent) = (1− U)× (1− D) (2)
For incongruent dilemmas, the probability of rejecting harm is
represented by the case that deontology drives the response when
utilitarianism does not:
p(unacceptable | incongruent) = (1− U)× D (3)
Conversely, the probability of accepting harm for incongruent
dilemmas is represented by the cases that utilitarianism drives
the response, and neither deontology nor utilitarianism drives the
response:
p(acceptable | incongruent) = U + [(1− U)× (1− D)] (4)
Next, researchers can enter the empirical distributions of
participant’s acceptable and unacceptable responses to congruent
and incongruent dilemmas into these equations, and then
algebraically combine them to solve for the two parameters. By
including Eq. 3 into Eq. 1, researchers can solve for U:
U = p(unacceptable | congruent)− p(unacceptable|incongruent)
(5)
Finally, by including the value for U in Eq. 3, researchers can
solve for D:
D = p(unacceptable | incongruent)/(1− U) (6)
Together, these formulas enable researchers to independently
estimate the degree to which participants systematically rejected
causing harm (deontology parameter) and systematically
maximize outcomes (utilitarian parameter).
RESULTS
Participants’ scores on the moral dilemma battery were process
dissociated to produce the Deontological Parameter (M = 0.45,
SD = 0.087), and the Utilitarian Parameter (M = −0.41,
SD = 0.163). Neither scale violated the assumption of normality
as verified via a Shapiro–Wilk’s test (Supplementary Figure S1).
The contrast Pain > Touch yielded clusters of activation
consistent with prior studies on empathy for pain (Lamm et al.,
2011). These clusters were located in visual cortex, inferior and
superior parietal cortex, motor cortex, inferior premotor cortex,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, thalamus,
and others (see Figure 2 and Supplementary Table S1). The
deontological PD parameter (reflecting harm-aversion dilemma
judgments) correlated with BOLD signal changes in the left
inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis, (see Figure 3 and Table 1).
As predicted, there were no correlations between the utilitarian
PD parameter (reflecting outcome-maximization judgments) and
BOLD signal changes for the contrast Pain > Touch.
DISCUSSION
This study is the first attempt to assess the relationship between
the BOLD signal while people witness others in pain and those
same peoples’ later response tendencies in hypothetical moral
dilemmas. It belongs to a larger project on the relationships
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FIGURE 2 | BOLD activation for the contrast Pain > Touch. Heat maps reflect Z-scores.
between type 1, pre-reflective responses to the internal states
of other people, and type 2, reflective prosocial decisions that
also includes two recent studies (Christov-Moore and Iacoboni,
2016; Christov-Moore et al., 2017). A broad array of brain
regions responded to the pain video task, but of those, later
harm-rejection (deontological) judgment tendencies were only
predicted by activation in a sensorimotor area (IFG) associated
with observing, imitating, and understanding the motor behavior
of others (Iacoboni, 2009; Urgesi et al., 2014), their internal
states (Carr et al., 2003; Lamm et al., 2011), and the broader
construct of empathy (Carr et al., 2003; Lamm et al., 2011) and
empathic accuracy (Paracampo et al., 2017). In contrast, areas
associated with affective processing of empathy for pain, such
as the anterior cingulate or anterior insula (Singer et al., 2004),
did not predict deontological responses, despite those areas
showing activation during the pain video task. As expected, no
brain activation while witnessing pain correlated with outcome-
maximization (utilitarian) judgment tendencies. These findings
cannot reflect priming effects from the pain video task, as
participants completed the dilemma battery at least 1 month
following the scanner session. Together, results suggest that
people who demonstrate greater sensorimotor empathy for
observed pain in others are more likely to avoid causing harm
(but not maximize outcomes) in hypothetical moral dilemmas.
These results, while correlational, support the hypothesis
that deontological response tendencies primarily reflect genuine
concern for others generated by witnessing pain, rather than
self-focused emotional reactions to causing pain – after all,
participants passively witnessed, rather than actively caused,
the painful needle stimuli (Miller et al., 2014). These findings
align with research linking deontological response tendencies
to other-oriented processing, such as empathic concern and
perspective-taking (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Conway and Gawronski,
2013; Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013), thereby corroborating
the dual-process model (Greene et al., 2001). However, these
findings do not rule out the possibility that self-focused concerns
regarding causing harm independently influence deontological
response tendencies via mechanisms not captured in the current
paradigm (Reynolds and Conway, in press).
Furthermore, these findings suggest the possible nature of
the functional processes supporting other-oriented affective
responses that lead to deontological choices. We employed
stimuli known to elicit activation in circuits involved in both
sensorimotor and general affective processing, and indeed found
activation in both regions during the pain video task. However,
only activation in the posterior inferior frontal cortex (pIFC) –
associated with sensorimotor processing but not general affective
processing – predicted subsequent deontological response
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FIGURE 3 | BOLD activation in the inferior premotor cortex for the contrast Pain > Touch predicts the deontological tendency in moral dilemmas. Heat map reflects
Z-scores of normalized goodness-of-fit of normalized deontological process dissociation (PD) parameter to parameter estimates of BOLD activation for the contrast
of interest. The descriptive scatterplot presents the relationship between the average BOLD parameter estimate in the premotor clusters and the normalized
deontological PD parameter. The R-value reflects a Pearson’s correlation between the average beta-parameter estimate in the premotor clusters and the
deontological parameter and is purely illustrative.
TABLE 1 | Clusters of high goodness-of-fit when regressing the deontological
parameter against parameter estimates for Pain > Touch across subjects.
Brain region x y z Z Voxels
Left inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis −58 16 14 3.65 173
Left inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis −64 8 −2 3.77 145
Left inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis −52 12 2 3.21 18
Coordinates are in MNI_152 space, reported in millimeters; normalized goodness-
of-fit is reported with Z-scores.
tendencies. Past work shows that the pain video used here
modulated transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)-induced
motor evoked potentials (MEPs), an index of motor excitability,
providing clear evidence for a sensorimotor component to
empathy (Avenanti et al., 2005). TMS-induced MEP modulation
while perceiving others’ hand actions, however, disappears
when pIFC and neighboring areas are transiently disrupted
by repetitive TMS (Avenanti et al., 2007). These findings
suggest that activity in pIFC and neighboring areas is crucial
for the sensorimotor component of empathy (Avenanti et al.,
2005). Hence, we believe the correlation between deontological
tendencies and pIFC activity in the current study is mainly
driven by the pIFC’s role in the sensorimotor component of
empathy. Furthermore, the role of the IFG in recognizing and
understanding the behavior of others (Urgesi et al., 2014) as
well as accurately assessing their internal states or empathic
accuracy (Paracampo et al., 2017) is consistent with the notion
that the pIFC integrates or provides links between high- and
low-level empathic processes like neural resonance and moral
decision-making.
We propose that the sensorimotor and affective mechanisms
used to process one’s own pain also react to abstract and
non-sensory harm to others, such as vivid images of pain –
including mental images conjured when considering hypothetical
moral dilemma scenarios. The more individuals recruit non-
agent-specific pain representations in response to others’
suffering, the more likely they are to personally appreciate
how others will experience harm. People who especially engage
in such implicit representations appear especially likely to
recoil from inducing pain on subsequent moral dilemma tasks
(i.e., reject causing even harm that maximizes outcomes).
Such findings are consistent with evidence that making harm
vivid reduces willingness to directly inflict harm in moral
dilemmas (e.g., Bartels, 2008), specifically through increased
deontological inclinations (Conway and Gawronski, 2013), and
that impairing visual processing reduces deontological judgments
(Amit and Greene, 2012). However, the present findings are
the first to suggest that the embodied consideration of other
people’s pain at a sensorimotor level influence moral decision-
making.
Obviously, these findings do not challenge the engagement of
affective systems in moral dilemma judgment tendencies. Indeed,
we should exercise caution extrapolating from the current
limited sample. The lack of brain-behavior correlation with
affective systems may reflect a false negative due to insufficient
power, or else indicate that perhaps affective processing in
moral dilemmas is relatively insensitive to individual differences
in judgment tendencies. Furthermore, because no subjective
evaluation was conducted regarding subject’s internal state
while observing the needle stimuli, we cannot be sure that
the task we used consistently tapped into concern for others,
rather than self-focused emotional/sensorimotor experience. The
relationship between these sensorimotor representations and
dilemma responses may not be the one hypothesized here.
However, the vicarious nature of this sensorimotor processing as
well as past studies showing correlations between neural activity
during similar tasks and other-oriented processes like empathy
and pro-sociality mitigate this concern.
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As predicted, these results failed to indicate an association
between brain activation while witnessing harm and utilitarian
response inclinations. This pattern meshes with previous findings
suggesting the utilitarian responses primarily reflect abstract
cognitive considerations of overall well-being, rather than a
concrete focus on harm (e.g., Greene et al., 2008; Moore et al.,
2008; Conway and Gawronski, 2013; cf. Kahane, 2015). Future
research might profitably examine whether the utilitarian PD
parameter correlates with brain activity when participants engage
in theory of mind reasoning, mathematical calculations, or other
abstract cognitive operations.
The current findings bolster the growing evidence that
individual variability in sensorimotor and affective neural
resonance predict differences in decision-making (Hein et al.,
2011; Ma et al., 2011; Morelli et al., 2014; Christov-Moore and
Iacoboni, 2016). Thus far, researchers have investigated this
link only in the realm of prosocial decision-making (decisions
involving potential gains); the current findings extend this
relationship to moral dilemma judgments (decisions involving
potential losses). Whereas some studies have implicated affective
areas like the anterior insula in motivating prosocial decisions
(Hein et al., 2011), others have implicated sensorimotor areas
like the superior parietal lobe (Christov-Moore and Iacoboni,
2016) and SII/pIFC (Ma et al., 2011). One interpretation of this
pattern suggests that general affective processing may be more
important for motivating prosocial behavior rather than harm
avoidance, whereas sensorimotor processing features for both.
Alternatively, it remains possible that the current stimuli do
not reveal the full extent to which general affective processing
impacts harm-avoidance judgments. Consider that the videos we
employed showed a close-up of hands getting pierced, without
accompanying stimuli associated with witnessing others in pain
(e.g., facial grimacing, cries of pain). Perhaps including such cues
may provide increased evidence for the impact of general affective
processing on dilemma decision-making. It remains likely that
the relative contributions of affective or sensorimotor processes
depend on multiple factors.
CONCLUSION
These findings are the first to demonstrate that, upon witnessing
others in pain, brain activation in sensorimotor circuits involved
in processing pain in the self predicts subsequent inclinations
to avoid causing harm in moral dilemmas (even to maximize
outcomes). Such findings clarify the importance of genuine
concern for others in dilemma judgments, corroborate the dual
process model, and provide further evidence for the utility of PD
in dilemma decision-making. Moreover, these findings suggest
a role for the embodied sensorimotor processing of harm when
making moral dilemma decisions. People with stronger internal
sensorimotor representations of others’ physical pain may be
especially unwilling to visit harm on others, even for a good cause.
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FIGURE S1 | Distributions of deontological and utilitarian moral dilemma response
tendencies. Solid line indicates ideal normal distribution. Mean and standard
deviation are presented for both response tendency subscales.
TABLE S1 | MNI coordinates (in mm) of representative peaks of activation for the
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